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ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The

District

Court Erred

BV Reversing The Magistrate

Court’s Order Denying Loosli’s Motion

To Suppress
A.

Introduction

In

its

Appellant’s brief, the state argued that the district court erred by reversing the

magistrate court’s order denying Loosli’s motion to suppress.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-12.)

Speciﬁcally, the state argued that that the district court erred in concluding that Ofﬁcer Rodriguez’s

request t0 see Loosli’s identiﬁcation,

Fourth

Amendment

seizure.

(Id.)

made

The

in the context

state

arguments contained in Loosli’s Respondent’s

B.

of a consensual encounter, constituted a

submits this reply brief to respond t0 some 0f the
brief.

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez’s Receipt Of Loosli’s Identiﬁcation, And His Brief Retention Of The
Identiﬁcation T0 Record Its Contents, Were Both Lawful Pursuant T0 Loosli’s Consent

The

district court

was consensual.

concluded that the

(R., p.127.)

initial

contact between Ofﬁcer Rodriguez and Loosli

Loosli has not challenged this determination on appeal.

(E

generally Respondent’s brief.) Instead, in his response to the state’s arguments, Loosli contends
that the district court’s order should

be afﬁrmed because, he

asserts:

(1)

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez’s

request for Loosli’s identiﬁcation constituted an unlawful Fourth Amendment seizure; and (2) even
if the request itself

did not constitute a seizure, Ofﬁcer Rodriguez then seized Loosli

by

retaining

A review

of

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez’s Request For Loosli’s Identiﬁcation Did Not Constitute

A

the identiﬁcation t0 record the information

applicable precedent reveals that Loosli

1.

is

on

it.1

(Respondent’s

brief, pp.5-13.)

incorrect.

Fourth Amendment Seizure
In

its

Appellant’s brief, the state set forth the well-established principle that in the context

0f a consensual contact, an ofﬁcer’s request to an individual for identiﬁcation
itself,

is

to constitute a seizure. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-12) (citing State V. Landreth,

not enough, by

139 Idaho 986,

989-990, 88 P.3d 1226, 1229-1230 (Ct. App. 2004) (“[A] request for identiﬁcation 0r mere
questioning
7

P.3d

crime.

.

is

219,

.

not enough, by itselﬂ,] to constitute a seizure”); State

222

(2000)

(“[E]Ven

Without

reasonable

V.

Nickel, 134 Idaho 610, 613,

suspicion

that

he

committed

a

[i]nterrogating a person concerning his identiﬁcation does not, Without more, constitute a

seizure”); State V.

Oxborne, 121 Idaho 520, 523-524, 826 P.2d 481, 484-485

Federal appellate courts have interpreted the Fourth Amendment similarity.

(Ct.

App. 1991).

(ﬂ Appellant’s

brief,

p.10 (citations omitted).)
In response, Loosli appears to contend, as the district court concluded, that even in the

context 0f a consensual encounter, an ofﬁcer commits an unlawful seizure
individual’s

1

The

identiﬁcation

unless

there

is

state notes that Loosli, the district court,

some

articulable

justiﬁcation

and some of the cases cited

by requesting an
for

the

request.

in both parties” brieﬁngs

collectively discuss and analyze: (1) ofﬁcers’ initial request and receipt of an individual’s
identiﬁcation; and (2) the ofﬁcer’s retention ofthe identiﬁcation, often t0 perform dispatch checks.

The

state construes this issue as raising

two separate questions.

encounter, does an ofﬁcer perform a Fourth

Amendment

In the context of a consensual

seizure either by: (1) requesting and

obtaining an individual’s identiﬁcation; and/or (2) retaining that identiﬁcation after Viewing
perform some task?

it

t0

(Respondent’s

brief, pp.5-13.)

47, 50 (1979) and State

V.

However, the cases Loosli

relies

upon:

Brown

V.

Texas, 443 U.S.

Landreth, 139 Idaho 986, 991, 88 P.3d 1226, 1231 (Ct. App. 2004), d0

not support his proposition.

m

concerned the constitutionality of a

m,

identify one’s self to peace ofﬁcers.

arrested

state statute

443 U.S.

which made

it

a crime to refuse to

Ofﬁcers stopped Brown, and then

at 50.

him When he refused t0 provide identiﬁcation upon request. Li As Loosli notes on appeal

(Respondent’s

brief, p.6),

“[b]ecause the record

was void of any

indication that the ofﬁcer

reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the United States
the ofﬁcer’s conduct

amounted

t0

an

illegal seizure.”

I_d.

at 52-53.

had a

Supreme Court held

that

However, the relevant ofﬁcer

conduct in that case was not the request for identiﬁcation, but the actual preceding detention of

Brown

him

“for the purpose of requiring

t0 identify himself.”

I_d.

Certainly, in the present case,

had Ofﬁcer Rodriguez ﬁrst detained Loosli, and then requested

his identiﬁcation, the seizure

would have run

more —

afoul 0f the Fourth

Amendment. However,

that the request for identiﬁcation, in the context

detention.

m

in this case, Loosli contends

of a consensual encounter, was

much

itself a

does not so hold.

Loosli next contends that State

for identiﬁcation constitutes a seizure

V.

Landreth supports his proposition that an ofﬁcer’s request

and

justiﬁcation. (Appellant’s brief, pp.7—8.)

to the contrary, that

is

unlawful unless

However,

it is

accompanied by some

in Landreth, the Idaho

articulable

Court oprpeals held,

an ofﬁcer’s request for Landreth’s identiﬁcation in the context of a consensual

encounter did not constitute a seizure. Landreth, 139 Idaho

at

989-990, 88 P.3d

at

1229-1230.

On

appeal in this case, Loosli points t0 dicta in Landreth cautioning that “our decision does not

countenance ofﬁcers

initiating ‘consensual contacts’

with individuals merely in order t0 follow

that contact with a request for identiﬁcation to run a license

check or a warrants check. Such a

law enforcement tactic would run afoul 0fthe Supreme Court decision in Brown, discussed above.”
Li. at 991,

88 P.3d

at

123 1.

Its

Brown,

citation to

as well as

its

use of scare quotes around the term

“consensual contacts,” indicate that the Court was warning ofﬁcers that detaining an individual,

and then requesting his identiﬁcation, Will not render the contact consensual. This warning has no
applicability to the present case,

where the

district court

concluded that Ofﬁcer Rodriguez’s

request for and receipt of Loosli’s identiﬁcation, done in the context 0f a consensual contact, itself

constituted a seizure.

Loosli also attempts t0 distinguish two United Supreme Court cases cited

Appellant’s brief for the general probation that even

particular individual, they

may

When

generally ask the individual questions and ask to examine his

Amendment
was present

that in those cases,

in this case.

is

accompanying request
is

M

Where the

that the ofﬁcers’ requests for identiﬁcation did not constitute Fourth

seizures, the ofﬁcer contacts in question involved a lesser display

even Where a contact

proposition

466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984);

446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980).) Loosli argues

Supreme Court found

state in its

ofﬁcers have no basis for suspecting a

identiﬁcation. (Appellant’s brief, p.10 (citing I.N.S. V. Delgado,

States V. Mendenhall,

by the

(Respondent’s

brief, pp. 11-12.)

consensual, there

may still be

for identiﬁcation a Fourth

of authority than

Therefore, Loosli appears to argue that

a display of authority sufﬁcient to render an

Amendment

seizure.

The

state

submits that this

simply contrary t0 the well-established line 0f cases cited above and in

its

Appellant’s brief providing that in the context of a consensual contact, an ofﬁcer’s request for

identiﬁcation

is

not enough, by

itself, t0

contact remains consensual, the ofﬁcer

offending the Fourth

compliance

is

Amendment

required. In

In other words, as long as a police

constitute a seizure.

may

unless the

any event, even

request an individual’s identiﬁcation Without

manner of

if the nature

the “request” itself indicates that

of the

initial

consensual contact can be a

factor in determining Whether an ofﬁcer’s request for an identiﬁcation constitutes a seizure, the

d0 not support a determination for

facts in this case

magistrate and district courts as to

L22 — p.31,
The

all

0f the same reasons as referenced by the

why the contact was consensual.

(E R., pp. 122- 127;

Tr.,

p.30,

L.5.)

district court erred in

concluding that Ofﬁcer Rodriguez’s request and obtaining 0f

Loosli’s identiﬁcation, accomplished in the context of a consensual encounter, constituted an

unlawful Fourth Amendment seizure. The court therefore erred in reversing the magistrate court’s
order denying Loosli’s motion t0 suppress.

2.

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez’s Brief Retention Of Loosli’s Identiﬁcation, Done With Loosli’s
Consent, Did Not Violate The Fourth Amendment

Approximately 10 seconds
Rodriguez asked Loosli
(State’s Exhibit

0n the license

1,

if

after requesting

and obtaining Loosli’s driver’s

license,

Ofﬁcer

he could hold onto the license longer t0 record the information 0n

1:34-1:38.)

it.

Loosli agreed. (Id.) Ofﬁcer Rodriguez recorded the information

in Loosli’s presence,

and then returned the license

t0 Loosli.

(State’s Exhibit

1,

2:02-22 10.) Approximately 30 seconds elapsed between Ofﬁcer Rodriguez’s request t0 retain the

license for longer,

and When the license was returned.

(State’s Exhibit

1,

1:34-2:10.)

Because the

district court

concluded that Loosli was seized when Ofﬁcer Rodriguez ﬁrst

did not speciﬁcally analyze Whether Ofﬁcer Rodriguez’s brief retention of

obtained his license,

it

the license t0 record

its

contents

would have

(E R., pp.

not already been seized.

“was requested and held

for

1

constituted a Fourth

(R., p.127),

appeal that this retention 0f the license violated the Fourth

First, the state

seizure

and challenges the

and because Loosli has argued 0n

Amendment

(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-

district court’s determination.

submits that the 10 seconds that Ofﬁcer Rodriguez utilized to

Loosli’s identiﬁcation

was reasonably Within

the scope of the consent provided

therefore did not constitute an unlawful seizure.

have concluded 0r argued

had Loosli

19-128.) However, because the court found that the license

n0 apparent reason”

12), the state addresses the issue

Amendment

It

does not appear that the

initially

View

by Loosli and

district court 0r

Loosli

t0 the contrary. If an ofﬁcer is permitted to request identiﬁcation in the

context 0f a consensual contact (as discussed above), the state submits that

is

reasonable, and

within the scope of that consent, to View the license for approximately 10 seconds in the
individual’s presence.

It is

also clear that that the subsequent

30 seconds utilized by Ofﬁcer

Rodriguez t0 record the contents of Loosli’s license, also done in Loosli’s presence, was likewise
justiﬁed by Loosli’s separate content to d0 so. Ofﬁcer Rodriguez did no more than what Loosli
speciﬁcally consented

to,

performed

this task in Loosli’s presence,

reasonable amount 0f time before returning the license

—

at

and completed the task

which point Loosli was

still

in a

free to

leave the encounter.

On appeal, Loosli relies upon a series of cases in Which Idaho appellate courts have reacted
With disapproval Where ofﬁcers

Who have

obtained individuals’ driver’s licenses then retained the

licenses for

some period of time

t0 run

checks through dispatch. (Appellant’s

brief,

pp.7-10 (“In

Idaho, the appellate courts have consistently held that the retention 0f a driver’s license amounts

to a detention.” (citing State V.

Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721, 404 P.3d 659, 663 (2017); State

Page, 140 Idaho 841, 844, 103 P.3d 454, 457 (2004); State

169 P.3d 291, 295
individuals

Whose

(Ct.

App.2007).) However, there

identiﬁcations were obtained

is

Zapata—Reves, 144 Idaho 703, 707,

V.

no indication

Idaho

at

705-706, 169 P.3d

Egg, 140 Idaho
at

at

E

any 0f these cases

293-294. The state submits that

that the

t0 the ofﬁcers’

Cohagan; 162 Idaho

at

719-

at

455-456; Zapata—Reyes, 144

if the

ofﬁcers in any 0f these cases

842-843, 103 P.3d

had speciﬁcally requested and obtained consent

in

by police speciﬁcally consented

extended retention of the identiﬁcations to run dispatch checks.
720, 404 P.3d at 661-662;

V.

t0 retain the identiﬁcations for

some period of

time to conduct dispatch checks, the ofﬁcers’ actions would not have constituted Fourth

Amendment

seizures?

As Loosli acknowledges 0n appeal (Respondent’s brief, p. 10, n. 1 .), the fact that the ofﬁcers
in the three cases retained the individuals’ driver’s licenses t0 conduct dispatch checks also

distinguishes those cases from the present case.

Not only were Ofﬁcer Rodriguez’s

actions in

recording the information from Loosli’s identiﬁcation done with speciﬁc consent from Loosli t0

do

2

so,

The

initial

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez performed the task

in Loosli’s presence,

state also notes that in these three cases relied

encounter and/or

initial

upon by

which provided Loosli the

Loosli, the consensual nature of the

ofﬁcer receipt of the individuals’ license

is

unclear. In

Cohagan, the

ofﬁcers “stop[ped]” Cohagan, Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 723-724, 404 P.3d at 665-666; in Egg, the
ofﬁcer “seized” Page’s identiﬁcation, Egg, 140 Idaho at 847, 103 P.3d at 460; and in Zapata-

Reyes, the ofﬁcer “asked Zapata—Reyes t0 step out of line at the taco stand” and “then secured
Zapata—Reyes’ driver’s license,” Zapata—Reyes, 144 Idaho at 707, 169 P.3d at 295.

opportunity t0 withdraw the consent.

Further, the act of simply recording the information

the license did not require, as dispatch checks do,

some period 0f time where

upon

the ofﬁcer and

individual are simply waiting for a third-party to complete his or her portion 0f the task.

Simply

reviewing and recording the information obtained on a license in a brief period of time thus
dramatically reduces the probability that a reasonable individual

leave.

The Idaho

feel

he was not entitled t0

appellate courts’ concerns regarding ofﬁcers obtaining individuals’ licenses and

then keeping then for

is

would

some indeﬁnite period of time while the

simply not present in

individual stands by, unable t0 leave,

this case.

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez’s brief retention of Loosli’s driver’s license
with Loosli’s consent — did not Violate the Fourth Amendment.3

t0 record

The court

its

contents

— done

therefore erred in

reversing the magistrate court’s order denying Loosli’s motion t0 suppress.

3

Loosli does not contend that the Idaho Constitution provides any

Amendment
Respondent’s

in the context
brief.)

of the relevant issues raised in

more protection than the Fourth

this

case.

(E

R., pp.13-18;

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests that this

Court reverse the

the magistrate court’s order denying Loosli’s motion t0 suppress

district court’s

and remand

order reversing

this case for further

proceedings.

DATED this

12th day 0f November, 2019.

/s/

Mark W. Olson

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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